工人挤兑

Worker Runs

Journal of Finance · 2025
被引 4
人大 A+FT50UTD24ABS 4*

中文导读

研究了难以替代的技术工人自愿离职如何引发连锁反应,并提出了企业通过固定工资与稀释性薪酬(如股权归属或奖金池)相结合来低成本留住员工的模型。

Abstract

ABSTRACT The voluntary departure of hard‐to‐replace skilled workers worsens firm prospects, which can lead to additional departures. We develop a model in which firms design compensation to limit the risk of such “worker runs.” To achieve cost‐efficient retention, firms combine fixed wages with dilutable compensation—such as vesting equity or bonus pools—which pays remaining workers more when others leave but gets diluted otherwise. Compensating (identical) workers with differently structured compensation, that is, with a different mix of output‐dependent and output‐independent pay, can further mitigate the risk of worker runs by ensuring a critical retention level in a cost‐efficient way.

工人挤兑薪酬设计稀释性薪酬关键员工保留