Crisis Interventions in Corporate Insolvency
构建一般均衡模型，研究破产企业的最优处置方式，发现清算能缓解银行资产负债表拥堵并产生正向抵押品外部性，而社会最优干预鼓励清算高运营亏损、高杠杆或低生产率的企业。
ABSTRACT We model the optimal resolution of insolvent firms in general equilibrium. Collateral‐constrained banks lend to (i) solvent firms to finance investments and (ii) distressed firms to avoid liquidation. Liquidations create negative fire‐sale externalities. Liquidations also relieve bank balance–sheet congestion, enabling new firm loans that generate positive collateral externalities by lowering bank borrowing rates. Socially optimal interventions encourage liquidation when firms have high operating losses, high leverage, or low productivity. Surprisingly, larger fire sales promote interventions encouraging more liquidations. We study synergies between insolvency interventions and macroprudential regulation, bailouts, deferred loss recognition, and debt subordination. Our model elucidates historical crisis interventions.