The Negative Consequences of Loss-Framed Performance Incentives
通过随机分配294家汽车经销商的销售奖金支付方式，发现预发奖金（损失框架）反而导致生产率下降，可能因增加了操纵行为。
Behavioral economists have proposed that incentive contracts result in higher productivity when bonuses are “loss framed”—prepaid then clawed back if targets are unmet. We test this claim by randomizing the pre- or postpayment of sales bonuses at 294 car dealerships. Although somewhat statistically imprecise, our analysis provides strong indications that the random assignment of loss framing had quantitatively important negative effects. We document that the negative effects of loss framing can arise due to an increase in incentives for “gaming” behaviors. Based on these claims, we reassess the common wisdom regarding the desirability of loss framing.