Effects of individual incentive reforms in the public sector: the case of teachers
研究葡萄牙公立学校引入教师个人绩效工资和锦标赛制的影响，发现该改革降低了学生考试成绩并加剧了分数膨胀，揭示了破坏员工合作可能带来的社会成本。
Abstract Can incentive schemes deliver value in the public sector, despite major principal-agent challenges? We evaluate a reform that introduced individual teacher performance-related pay and tournaments in public schools in Portugal, despite trade union opposition. We find evidence that the focus on individual performance decreased student achievement (as measured by national exams) and increased grade inflation. The results follow from a difference-in-differences analysis of matched student-school panels and two complementary control groups (including private schools). Students with a higher proportion of teachers exposed to tournaments also perform worse. Overall, our results highlight the social costs of disrupting workers’ cooperation, a possible unintended consequence of public-sector tournaments.