Cartelization and Expected Crash Risk: Evidence From Global Leniency Laws
利用美国企业所在外国宽大法律的通过，研究发现卡特尔化程度降低后企业预期崩盘风险显著上升，且该效应在更可能合谋、经理人压力更大及信息中介效率较低的企业中更明显。
ABSTRACT Exploiting the staggered passage of leniency laws in foreign countries to which United States (US) firms are exposed that exogenously renders cartelization less feasible, we show that firms’ expected crash risk significantly increases following the passage of foreign leniency laws. This increase is more evident for firms more likely to engage in collusion, for firms whose managers face greater pressure to conceal poor performance, and when information intermediaries are less effective in assisting investors’ information processing. We further explore the underlying mechanism through which cartelization affects expected crash risk and find that firms with greater exposure to foreign leniency laws exhibit stronger asymmetric responses to bad versus good news disclosures and lower accounting conservatism. Overall, this study shows that cartelization mitigates managers’ bad news hoarding, thus influencing investors’ perceptions of a firm's future crash risk.