Solid outcomes in finite games
提出并分析了有限博弈的一种新解概念“稳固结果”，它不受博弈表示形式影响，与逆向归纳一致，且不受占优策略增减影响，适用于完美回忆的有限扩展式博弈，并给出了识别算法。
A new solution concept for finite games is presented and analyzed. It is defined in terms of outcomes—probability distributions over the plays of the game. Solid outcomes are robust to the representation of the game, whether in normal or extensive form, and are consistent with backward induction. They are also unaffected by the removal or addition of dominated strategies. Solid outcome sets exist in all finite extensive-form games with perfect recall. They have support in minimal “game blocks,” a class of product sets of pure-strategy profiles that are robust set-valued candidates for conventions and social norms in recurrent population play of the game. Algorithms for identifying all solid outcomes are presented, and simulations illustrate the solution concept's significant cutting power and computational efficiency.