Simple forward induction in monotonic multi-sender signaling games
提出“简单前向归纳”这一新解概念，用于单调多发送者信号博弈，证明存在唯一结果且不被信息不对称扭曲，该结果是有限博弈稳定结果的极限。对研究博弈论和信息经济学的学者有用。
Abstract We introduce a new, powerful, and easy-to-use solution concept called simple forward induction which is implied by strategic stability in generic finite multi-sender signaling games. We apply this concept to infinite monotonic signaling games and show that a unique simple forward induction outcome exists and is non-distorted by asymmetric information. We also show that, in this class of games, the non-distorted outcome is the limit of stable outcomes of finite games. Hence, in this sense, we characterize stable outcomes in this class of games. The definition of our solution concept can be easily extended to arbitrary extensive-form games.