Two-person bargaining when the disagreement point is private information
研究了两人讨价还价中分歧收益为私人信息的情况，发现帕累托边界线性时事后有效机制的中间效用不依赖于分歧收益，非线性时在特定条件下结论仍成立，对公理化讨价还价理论和知情委托人剩余提取有启示。
We consider two-person bargaining problems in which (only) the disagreement payoffs are private information and it is common knowledge that disagreement is inefficient. We show that, in the NTU-case, if the Pareto frontier is linear, the players' interim utilities of an ex post efficient mechanism cannot depend on the disagreement payoffs. If the frontier is non-linear, the result continues to hold when the conflict payoffs are independent, or one player has at most two types. In the TU-case, a similar independence result holds for ex post efficient mechanisms that are individually rational, provided the players' budgets satisfy a certain condition. We discuss implications of these results for axiomatic bargaining theory, surplus extraction by an informed principal and egalitarian mechanisms.