Statute of Limitations for Tax Evasion
通过实验室实验研究追溯审计和不同诉讼时效对税收合规的影响，发现较长的诉讼时效通过提高预期惩罚促进合规，并指出3年时效在合规收益与行政效率间达到最优平衡。
ABSTRACT We investigate the effects of retroactive audits and varying statutes of limitations on tax compliance through a laboratory experiment. First, we solve a dynamic model using Bellman's solution to show that longer limitation periods promote compliance by raising expected penalties, as each past period carries a higher probability of inspection. Second, in our experiment, we manipulate the statute of limitations (0, 1, 3, and 6 periods), providing data that support the model's predictions. Our data also suggest that a 3‐year statute of limitation optimally balances compliance benefits with administrative efficiency.