Textual uncertainty in financial disclosures and information asymmetry among investors
研究发现，当管理层发布更不确定的财务报告时，知情与不知情交易者之间的信息不对称程度显著降低，因为专业交易者更难从不确定的文本中提取有价值的信息。
Abstract Prior literature documents a temporary spike in information asymmetry between sophisticated and unsophisticated traders around corporate disclosures because the former process new information faster. Using advances in textual analysis, we show that when management issues more uncertain financial statements, the resulting spike in information asymmetry is significantly lower than for firms that use less uncertain text. Furthermore, textual uncertainty measures of the disclosures are negatively associated with Intermarket Sweep Order (ISO) volume, an order type commonly used by sophisticated traders. This suggests sophisticated traders and algorithms are less able to extract value‐relevant information from financial disclosures when they are uncertain.