Strategic Reneging and Market Power in Sequential Markets
研究有市场势力的企业如何通过战略违约操纵市场，利用两期模型和机器学习分析阿尔伯塔省电力市场数据，发现一家供应商通过违约使年采购成本增加6亿美元（+17%）。
ABSTRACT This article investigates the incentives for firms with market power to manipulate markets by strategically reneging on forward commitments. We first study the behavior of a dominant firm in a two‐period model with demand uncertainty. We then use the model's predictions and a machine learning approach to investigate multiple occurrences of reneging on long‐term commitments in Alberta's electricity market in 2010–2011. We find that a supplier significantly increased its revenues by strategically reneging on its capacity availability obligations, causing Alberta's annual electricity procurement costs to increase by as much as $600 million (+17%).