The Competitive Conduct of Consumer Cooperatives
利用意大利超市行业的数据和结构模型，检验消费者合作社是否追求利润最大化，发现其行为与利润最大化无显著差异，且即使轻微内化消费者福利也能带来与监管优势相当的福利提升。
ABSTRACT Consumer cooperatives are firms owned by their customers. Although their organizational form should commit these firms not to exploit their market power, in practice, weak governance may allow managers to pursue other objectives. Using data and a structural model, we test whether consumer cooperatives in the Italian supermarket industry act as profit‐maximizing firms. We find no significant deviations from profit maximization. Based on a counterfactual exercise, even a mild degree of internalization of consumer welfare by the cooperatives that we study would yield consumer welfare gains comparable to the regulatory advantages they enjoy.