Endogenous Prices in Markets with Reputational Concerns
研究了一个长期卖方与短期买方互动的动态经验品模型，将价格内生化，发现由谁定价（卖方或买方）会显著影响均衡特征，如卖方定价时出现工作-偷懒动态，买方定价时存在卖方建立并永久维持声誉的均衡。
ABSTRACT I set up a dynamic experience goods model where a long‐lived seller interacts with a sequence of short‐lived buyers and where the seller has reputational concerns. The key innovation of the article is to endogenize prices in this framework, specifically by endowing either the seller or the buyers with the ability to post price. I show that influence over prices has a strong impact on equilibrium characteristics. If the seller posts price, equilibria will display work‐shirk dynamics. If the buyers post price, however, there is always an equilibrium where the seller builds and perpetually maintains her reputation.