Transparency and Policymaking with Endogenous Information Provision
研究当信息由有偏见的游说者内生提供时，政治家的声誉关切如何影响信息提供，并发现这取决于透明度设计。
ABSTRACT How does the politician's reputation concern affect information provision when the information is endogenously provided by a biased lobbyist? I develop a model to study this problem and show that the answer depends on the transparency design. When the lobbyist's preference is publicly known, the politician's reputation concern induces the lobbyist to provide more information. When the lobbyist's preference is unknown, the politician's reputation concern may induce the lobbyist to provide less information. One implication of the result is that given transparent preferences, the transparency of decision consequences can impede information provision by moderating the politician's reputational incentive.