Signaling long-term information using short-term forecasts
理论和实证表明，公司发布短期盈利预测的决定能揭示管理层对长期业绩的私有信息，且该预测能力在当期业绩差、管理层任期长或竞争威胁低时更强。
This paper shows theoretically and empirically that the decision to disclose a short-term earnings forecast can reveal managers’ private information about long-term performance. Consistent with the predictions of our model, we find that the decision to disclose a short-term earnings forecast predicts long-term performance for up to three years. The relation strengthens when current period performance is poor, when managers have longer horizons, and when competitive threats are lower. Endogenizing the proprietary costs of disclosure, our analysis suggests that––despite the short horizon––the decision to provide an earnings forecast contains significant information about long-term performance and thus can entail proprietary costs.