Distributed governance and value creation in decentralized autonomous organizations: Evidence from a regression discontinuity design
利用2020至2024年区块链DAO的投票数据，通过断点回归发现提案通过使代币回报边际增加4.7%，且投票参与度、民主化和去中心化程度会放大这一效应，对研究分布式治理如何创造价值有参考意义。
• We study governance mechanisms in decentralized autonomous organizations (DAOs). • Regression discontinuity design on contested proposals overcomes endogeneity concerns. • Distributed governance mechanisms increase tokenholders value. • Proposal passage increases DAO token returns by 4.7 % at the margin. • Effect amplified by voter participation, DAO democratization, and DAO decentralization. Distributed governance mechanisms increase tokenholders value in decentralized autonomous organizations (DAOs) when decision-making is contested. Using a comprehensive dataset of proposals voted on within blockchain-based DAOs from 2020 to 2024, we exploit a regression discontinuity design on proposals that pass or fail by a close margin around the majority threshold. Local average treatment effects indicate that proposal passage increases DAO token returns by 4.7 % at the margin. Further, a one standard deviation increase in vote participation amplifies this effect by 2.2 %. Proxies for democratization and decentralization also increase the value-creating effect of contested decision-making in DAOs. Our findings contribute to understanding how distributed governance structures create value in digital organizations.