Understanding Micro‐Level Budgeting Behavior: How Cognitive Biases Shape Politicians' Budget Preferences
通过五项预注册实验，研究了锚定、从众、心理账户、可得性偏差和损失厌恶五种认知偏差对荷兰1825名市政预算官员预算偏好的影响，发现这些偏差导致非最优预算决策，而信息图表有助于改善判断。
ABSTRACT Decades of research emphasized collective behaviors in public budgeting, yet individual budget preferences remain underexplored. This paper argues that both well‐known and lesser‐known cognitive biases distort politicians' budget judgment, resulting in biased preferences. To test this, we conducted five preregistered experiments examining the impact of five biases—anchoring, herding, mental accounting, availability bias, and loss aversion—on budget preferences. Using data from 1825 municipal budgeters in The Netherlands, we reveal significant effects of anchoring, adherence to irrelevant budget labels (mental accounting), and overspending on items that attract media attention (availability bias) or emphasize gains (loss aversion). We also find that presenting decision information through infographics holds potential for improving judgment and mitigating biases in preferences. These findings challenge the view that budgeting is purely political, highlighting the role of cognitive factors in suboptimal budget decisions. We emphasize the need for further research into biases and debiasing mechanisms to advance budget decision‐making.