Campaign contributions and legislative behavior: Evidence from U.S. Congress
研究发现，美国国会成员的竞选捐款越集中在少数大额捐赠者手中，他们在立法活动（如提出法案、发表演讲、出席听证会）中的投入就越少，尤其在医疗、社会福利等再分配议题上更为明显。
What is the relationship between campaign contributions and legislative behavior of elected representatives? In this paper, I find that more concentrated donations negatively correlate with three costly legislative endeavors of members of Congress: bill sponsorship, speechmaking on the floor and witness appearances before committees. For bill sponsorship, the negative correlation is stronger for topics related to redistribution, such as health and social welfare bills. To interpret these results, I argue that a more skewed structure of contributions makes members of Congress more dependent on their top donors and thus potentially more inclined to represent their interests. By reciprocating favors to donors, by seeking to secure their continued financial support, or simply by enjoying more leisure time as a result of feeling secure in their financial backing, federal legislators are less active in activities related to the Congressional agenda and public policy. Overall, I contend that campaign contributions distort the incentives of elected representatives to allocate legislative effort in Congress. • Legislators with more skewed structure of donations do less in Congress. • Legislative production is negatively correlated with reliance on big donations. • Campaign contributions distort the incentives of legislators to allocate effort.