Guardians and Spenders in the Budgetary Process: More Than One Type of Relations
本文挑战了预算研究中将支出者视为统一行动者的观点，通过比较以色列四个社会部委，发现守护者与支出者之间存在从高度自治到严格控制的多种关系，其差异取决于超支或低效的风险感知。
ABSTRACT The budget is the outcome of bargaining between spenders and guardians. Most research on budgeting sees all spenders as a unitary actor. This article argues, instead, that there are different relations at play between guardians and each spending ministry. Based on a comparison between four social ministries in Israel, it shows that these relations differ in terms of the level of involvement of guardians in spenders' budgetary inputs and outputs, ranging from near‐complete autonomy within existing budget limits to tight budgetary control and interference in policymaking. The difference is a function of the perceived risk of overspending or ineffectiveness. When the guardian's level of involvement is high, the dynamic between the parties can be conflictual if they do not share the same policy ideas. In a conflictual dynamic, spenders have more chances of forcing their will on guardians if they can use their political power to stand up to them.