The Impact of Say‐On‐Pay on Firm Efficiency in Anglo‐Saxon Economies—Do CEO Personal Traits and CG Mechanisms Matter?
研究了薪酬话语权投票对企业效率的影响，发现投票能提升效率，年轻CEO贡献更大，但董事会参与有限，对政策制定者和从业者有启示。
ABSTRACT In this study, we explore how the personal traits of CEOs and corporate governance mechanisms moderate the link between say‐on‐pay (SOP) votes and various aspects of firm efficiency. Our sample consists of 1931 firms listed in four Anglo‐Saxon economies (i.e., USA, UK, Canada and Australia) during a period of notable regulatory changes. Our findings reveal a significant and positive impact of SOP votes on firm efficiency. This suggests that company executives recognise that lower efficiency leads to lower pay or even job loss. Interestingly, our analysis indicates that younger managers can contribute more to creating value and improving business performance compared with their older counterparts. However, the relationship between gender and firm efficiency remains inconclusive. Furthermore, our study highlights the limited involvement of the board of directors in driving firm efficiency. This could be attributed to inadequate monitoring, cooperation and communication among board members, particularly in the case of audit committees, which seem to have less skilled members. Alternatively, this lack of board engagement may be due to the influence of powerful managers within the company. This paper also offers practical implications to policymakers and practitioners and suggests avenues for future research that can build upon our evidence.