Guaranteed Employment in Rural India: Intra-Household Labor and Resource Allocation Consequences
研究了印度农村就业保障计划对家庭内部劳动和资源分配的影响，发现该计划降低了已婚女性的劳动参与率和丈夫的总工作时间，同时减少了女性对家庭收入的控制权，尽管增加了家庭消费。
I investigate the intra-household labor and resource allocation consequences of an employment guarantee targeting rural households in India. The guarantee insures household earnings, replacing women as added workers and shutting down a motive for saving. Despite sizable program-job take-up, the guarantee decreases participation in other working activities, and, thus, the labor force participation of married women and total time worked by their husbands. The guarantee accounts for up to 30% of a recent countrywide decrease in rural female labor force participation. Though it increases household consumption, the guarantee reduces the command of household earnings by women, and, thereby, their wellbeing.