TAXATION OF TOP INCOMES AND TAX AVOIDANCE
研究了提高最高边际所得税率在存在企业家避税行为时的总体和分配效应，发现避税削弱了高收入税对不平等的影响，但消除避税能增加税收、产出和福利。
Abstract We examine the aggregate and distributional effects of raising the top marginal income tax rate in the presence of entrepreneurial tax avoidance. In a model with heterogeneous agents and occupational choice, entrepreneurs can avoid taxes by choosing the legal form of business organization and shifting income across tax bases. Applied to the U.S. economy, we find that tax avoidance weakens the distortionary effects of higher income taxes at the top but makes them ineffective at lowering inequality. Eliminating tax avoidance by an equal tax treatment of entrepreneurs across all legal forms substantially increases tax revenue, aggregate output, and welfare.