Beyond Simplification in Public Sector Accountability: Contradictions Between Principal‐Agent and Complexity Theories
这篇概念性研究指出，传统委托代理理论用僵化合同简化公共部门问责，但实际复杂情况更适合用复杂性理论解释，并呼吁发展更灵活的问责框架。
ABSTRACT This conceptual study explores the complexity of public sector accountability, traditionally framed by principal‐agent theory (PAT), which simplifies relationships through rigid contracts. The findings reveal how PAT's assumptions often misalign with the intricate realities of public sector accountability, which are better explained by complexity theories (CT). Contradictions between PAT and CT assumptions are highlighted, underlining the need for more flexible and dynamic accountability frameworks. The study calls for further research to refine the concept of complexity‐based accountability and investigate tensions between practical accountability applications of PAT and CT. Such research could transform public administration practice and scholarship by better accommodating the complex realities of managing public services.