How do bank lenders use borrowers’ financial statements? Evidence from a survey of Japanese banks
通过对99家日本银行的调查，研究了银行放贷人如何使用借款人的会计信息进行贷款决策和持续监控，发现他们偏好与现金流挂钩的持续性收益，并保守地调整借款人营运资本。
Previous studies suggest that the use of accounting information varies by a country’s financial system. In this study, we focus on Japan, a bank-centred economy with a financial system that differs from the US, and survey bank lenders to examine how they use borrowers’ accounting information in their lending practices. Using responses from 99 Japanese banks, we show that bank lenders use accounting information for lending decisions and continuous monitoring. They prefer persistent earnings tied to cash flows and conservatively modify borrowers’ working capital. From the survey responses about financial covenants, we find that Japanese lenders mainly use the maintenance of net assets and accounting earnings as financial covenants and expect these covenants to be tripwires to obtain bargaining power. Moreover, we document that the unique tradition of close bank–firm relationships, referred to as the main bank system, is still prevalent. Our investigation extends the literature by focusing on the bank-centred financial system and providing direct evidence of bank lenders’ actual use of accounting information.