Information Disclosure in Preemption Races: Blessing or (Winner's) Curse?
研究了在共同价值风险项目中，企业为抢先投资而竞争时，信息披露对福利的影响。发现对称竞争下信息披露无关福利，不对称时福利最高，且促进披露的政策可能适得其反。
ABSTRACT Firms receiving independent signals on a common‐value risky project compete to be the first to invest. When firms are symmetric and competition is winner‐take‐all, rents are fully dissipated in equilibrium and the extent to which signals are publicly disclosed is irrelevant for welfare. When disclosure of signals is asymmetric, welfare is highest when firms are most asymmetric, and policies that uniformly promote disclosure may backfire, especially when competition is severe. When firms strategically select their disclosure policies, a moderate subsidy for disclosure induces a low correlation between firms' policies, and thus maximizes welfare.