Product Development with Lurking Patentees
研究了专利持有者如何通过“潜伏”策略等待开发者无意侵权后发起专利劫持，以及这种策略对开发者技术选择的影响，发现潜伏在均衡中普遍存在，可能导致低效投资或采用劣质技术，而FRAND承诺可提升效率并惠及各方。
ABSTRACT Innovative product developers are often uninformed about relevant patents. Patentees may exploit this by strategically “lurking”—refraining from ex ante licensing in the hope that developers will unwittingly infringe, creating an opportunity for “patent holdup.” We contribute to the literature by introducing a framework to explore when strategic lurking is profitable and how it affects developers' technology decisions. We find that lurking is pervasive in equilibrium, and it may lead to inefficient investment or adoption of inferior technologies. Commitments to license patents on reasonable (or “FRAND”) terms can improve efficiency and benefit all parties.