Top management team means-ends diversity and competitive dynamics
研究了高管团队在战略手段和目标上的分歧（手段-目标多样性）如何抑制企业竞争行动倾向，并发现可转换的冗余资源会加剧这种抑制，而不可转换的战略投资则相反，且竞争行动倾向与企业绩效呈倒U型关系。
We examine how top management team (TMT) members' disagreement about strategic means and ends – means-ends diversity (MED) – affects firms' propensity to take competitive action in the context of fungible versus non-fungible resources. Theorizing in part from TMT diversity literature, we contribute to competitive dynamics and upper echelons research by demonstrating how top team MED shapes competitive outcomes. Contrary to common assumptions, our results suggest that such diversity can inhibit rather than promote competitive propensity. Importantly, we argue that firm resource profiles are pivotal in moderating this relationship. To be specific, we find that multipurpose fungible resources like slack augment this suppression, whereas non-fungible strategic investments galvanize action and do the opposite. Moreover, we find that too weak and too great a propensity for competitive action diminishes firm performance. Theoretical contributions and research implications are discussed. • Top management team means-ends diversity (MED) inhibits competitive propensity (CP). • Fungible slack resources augment the suppression of MED to CP. • By contrast, committed strategic investments reduce the suppression, and hence galvanize CP. • CP has an inverted-U-shaped effect on firm performance.