The Minsk Game
本文通过分析乌克兰国内利益集团政治的简单模型，探讨明斯克协议为何未能阻止乌克兰战争，并揭示购买和平的有效政策类型。
Abstract Why did the Minsk Accords fail to prevent the current Ukraine War? Standard explanations for the diplomatic failure center on irreconcilable commitment problems between Moscow and Washington: both revisionist with respect to the other, neither able to credibly promise non-involvement in the other’s perceived sphere of influence, and both capable of recruiting local allies within Ukraine. This account omits relevant historical context related to the demographic legacy of the Soviet Union. To shed light on the kinds of policies that would be most effective at “buying peace” in some dimly-visible future, we analyze a simple model of domestic Ukrainian interest group politics.