Heterogeneous Price Technologies
研究了市场中买卖双方拥有不同信息追踪技术时的动态寡头定价，发现追踪者通常损害消费者利益，而非追踪者可通过限价策略对抗合谋。
ABSTRACT We present a unified theory of dynamic oligopoly pricing with heterogeneous information technologies on each side of the market. Trackers (on the firm‐side) and shoppers (on the consumer‐side) can follow market prices costlessly, whereas non‐trackers and non‐shoppers cannot. We describe both non‐collusive and collusive equilibria. While the effects of tracking may be non‐monotone, the presence of trackers generally harms consumers. The price pattern that arises with trackers and non‐trackers reconciles a multitude of cross‐sectional price patterns, such as persistent price differences and adherence to or avoidance of certain prices. We find that non‐trackers can counter tracker collusion by applying a limit‐price strategy.