Bank recovery and resolution planning, liquidity management and fragility
研究监管如何影响金融脆弱性与银行流动性管理的互动，论证银行恢复与处置规划的互补性，分析处置机构在银行挤兑时设立“好银行”的成本与银行提前制定恢复计划的时间不一致问题。
We study how regulation shapes the interaction between financial fragility and bank liquidity management, and propose a rationale for the complementarity between bank recovery and resolution planning. To this end, we analyze an economy in which a resolution authority arranges a bank resolution plan to suspend deposit withdrawals and create a “good bank” at a cost in the event of a depositors’ run. In such a framework, banks find it optimal to establish recovery plans in advance, specifying how to manage liquidity during runs. However, such plans are time inconsistent, and resolution authorities need powers to force their implementation at times of financial fragility .