Platform acquisition in a triple-channel supply chain
研究了在线零售平台收购传统零售商后，对制造商、零售商、消费者及社会福利的影响，发现收购可能提升平台和收购方利润，并改善消费者剩余。
Motivated by the observation that some online retail platforms begin to enter offline channels by acquiring traditional retailers, this paper studies the impact of platform acquisition in a context where a manufacturer sells a product via an online agency selling and two offline reselling channels. Considering three changes brought by platform acquisition in practice, namely, showrooming, “pay online but pickup in store (POPS)” and pricing power transfer effects, we investigate how platform acquisition impacts the firms’ pricing behaviors and profits, customer surpluses, and social welfare. Our analysis shows that, although acquisition may hurt the upstream manufacturer and the non-acquired traditional retailer, it always makes the platform and the acquired traditional retailer better off as a whole. Further, it may benefit the total supply chain and improve consumer surpluses and social welfare. Interestingly, platform acquisition leads to a demand siphon force (shifting demand from the non-acquired channel to the two channels related to acquisition) when platform acquisition brings strong showrooming and POPS effects; otherwise, it leads to the opposite demand spillover force. Finally, regarding the decision on the acquisition fee, there exists a moderate range that enables the platform and offline retailer to achieve a win-win situation. These findings collectively provide some valuable insights for decision-makers to understand the impacts of platform acquisition in a competitive triple-channel supply chain.