The nature of the decentralised autonomous organisation
从组织经济学角度分析去中心化自治组织（DAO）与传统组织的区别，探讨其长期可行性，指出DAO需通过智能合约和内部竞争市场抑制代理成本，但面临治理和参与挑战。
Abstract This paper examines the concept of decentralised autonomous organisations (DAOs), blockchain-based entities intended to operate without central authority or management hierarchy, through the lens of organisational economics. It compares DAOs with conventional organisational forms and explores whether DAOs represent a novel organisational form. The paper investigates DAOs in the context of the electronic markets hypothesis and applies theories from Demsetz, Jensen and Meckling, and Williamson to understand their potential long-term viability. A key finding is that for DAOs to function as claimed, they must effectively suppress agency costs through smart contracts and internal contestable markets. The paper also highlights the challenges DAOs face in maintaining adaptive integrity and fostering cooperative adaptation. While DAOs show promise in reducing certain transaction and information costs, their long-term viability depends on overcoming significant governance and participation hurdles.