The Decline of Too Big to Fail
研究发现，美国全球系统重要性银行在金融危机后市场隐含的政府救助概率显著下降，批发债务融资成本上升约170%，表明“太大而不能倒”现象有所减弱。
For globally systemically important banks (GSIBs) with US headquarters, we find significant reductions in market-implied probabilities of government bailout after the Global Financial Crisis (GFC), along with roughly 170 percent higher wholesale debt financing costs for these banks after controlling for insolvency risk. Since the GFC, bank creditors appear to expect much larger losses in the event that a GSIB approaches insolvency. In this sense, we estimate a decline of “too big to fail.” (G01, G12, G21, G28, G33, H81)