“Bid Shopping” in Procurement Auctions with Subcontracting
分析了承包商在采购拍卖前向分包商询价、再将该报价展示给其他分包商以压低价格的行为，发现向已投标分包商询价降低福利，而向未投标分包商询价可能提高福利。
Abstract We analyse the equilibrium effects of “bid shopping”—a contractor soliciting a subcontractor bid for part of a project prior to a procurement auction, then showing that bid to a competing subcontractor in an attempt to secure a lower price. Such conduct is widely criticized as unethical by professional organizations and has been the target of legislation at both the federal and state level but is widespread in procurement auctions in many places. We find that in equilibrium, a winning contractor’s practice of shopping her subcontractor’s bid to other subcontractors who have already submitted bids is welfare-decreasing, while shopping bids to new subcontractors who have not yet bid can be welfare-increasing, particularly when subcontractors’ bid preparation costs are sufficiently high.