Does disappointment aversion explain non-truthful reporting in strategy-proof mechanisms?
通过新颖实验设计，检验失望厌恶是否为策略证明学校选择匹配机制中非真实排名的一个解释，发现其影响较小且统计上仅边缘显著。
Abstract Disappointment aversion has been suggested as an explanation for non-truthful rankings in strategy-proof school-choice matching mechanisms. We test this hypothesis using a novel experimental design that eliminates important alternative causes of non-truthful rankings. The design uses a simple contingent choice task with only two possible outcomes. Between two treatments, we manipulate the possibility for disappointment aversion to have an effect on ranking. We find a small and statistically marginally significant treatment effect in the direction predicted by disappointment aversion. We therefore conclude that disappointment aversion is a minor contributor to non-truthful rankings in strategy-proof school-choice matching mechanisms.