What you don't know, can't hurt you: Avoiding donation requests for environmental causes
通过在线实验发现，9%的参与者付费选择退出捐款请求，社会信息会降低标准独裁者游戏中的捐款，但对退出选择影响不显著，且初始行为的情境和动机影响后续捐款的溢出效应。
Recent research suggests that people are willing to pay to avoid requests for prosocial behavior. However, it is unknown whether this applies to private pro-environmental requests. To study this, we conducted a pre-registered, incentivized online experiment where participants played two consecutive dictator games with an environmental charity of their choice. In stage 1, we varied the type of dictator game and the information provided in a 2 × 2 factorial between-subject design: (i) a standard dictator game versus one with a costly opt-out option; (ii) with or without social information about the average donation made by participants in a previous session. All participants played a standard dictator game in stage 2, the primary aim of which was to capture temporal spillovers from stage 1. Overall, 9 % of participants opted out, leading to lower donations in the dictator game with the costly opt-out option. Providing social information decreases donations in the standard dictator game and appears to increase opt-outs when the costly opt-out option is available, but not statistically significant. Distinct spillover effects emerged depending on the options available and decisions made in stage 1, indicating that the context and motivation of the initial behavior affect the direction of the temporal spillover. • Do people avoid donation requests and does it depend on social information? • 9 % paid to opt out from a private dictator game (DG) with an environmental charity. • Social information decreased donations in standard DG, but no clear effect on opt-outs. • Initial context and motivation influenced the direction of temporal spillovers.