Information orders in screening problems
研究了筛选模型中不同信号对委托人收益的影响，发现布莱克威尔排序和风险率扩散排序能刻画信号的稳健优劣，并分析了这些排序对其他福利指标的影响。
This paper studies information orders in screening models. I amend a general screening problem with a signal about the agent's type. The principal prefers one signal to another for any preferences of principal and agent if and only if the signals are ranked by Blackwell's order. Under a standard regularity condition, a novel information order – the hazard rate spread (HRS) order – characterizes a robust ranking of signals by the principal. I relate the HRS order to well-known information orders and provide sufficient conditions for other welfare measures than the principal's payoff to increase or decrease in the HRS order.