Unmasking greenwashing in ESG disclosure: insights from evolutionary game analysis
通过演化博弈分析企业、投资者和评级机构在ESG披露中的策略互动，揭示漂绿行为导致的市场困境，并指出结合市场机制与政府监管（如强制披露、评级机构监督）可消除漂绿，实现理想状态。
Abstract Environmental, Social, and Governance (ESG) disclosure is acknowledged as a compelling initiative to facilitate sustainable business practices. However, greenwashing undermines the credibility of this initiative, presenting a decision dilemma for stakeholders. Involving principal stakeholders (enterprises, investors, rating agencies) in ESG disclosure, this study conducts an evolutionary game analysis to explore the strategic evolution mechanisms. The equilibrium results suggest the potential market dilemma stemming from deceptive enterprises and unreliable rating agencies. Meanwhile, the system can converge to an ideal state without greenwashing. Reaching this state necessitates a market-based approach combined with government regulations, such as the ongoing monitoring of rating agencies to provide truthful and stringent ESG evaluation. Additionally, mandatory enterprise ESG disclosure is a robust measure to curb greenwashing. Investment-returns-based solutions can be considered for investors to augment the rigorous ESG ratings. Managers should understand the impact factors and evolution paths in ESG disclosure and how to deal effectively with greenwashing.