Are Lessons Well Learned? Evidence from SEC Enforcement Releases
研究美国证券交易委员会涉及高管薪酬的会计审计执法公告如何影响未受指控的同行公司，发现这些公司会调整CEO薪酬结构以降低风险激励，从而规避诉讼和股东审查。
ABSTRACT This paper investigates the impact of accounting and auditing enforcement releases (AAERs) on the compensation policies of nonaccused firms. The investigation focuses on releases in which the SEC mentions top executives’ pursuit of wealth through compensation schemes (i.e., compensation mentioned releases (CMRs)). Using a sample of AAERs from 1992 to 2021, I find that peer firms learn from these CMRs and significantly reduce their CEO’s delta and vega following CMRs. Peer firms also decrease their performance share grants and extend the vesting periods for option grants, resulting in a decrease in the convex payoff structure of CEO pay. Furthermore, I find evidence that peer firms reduce their CEO’s risk-taking incentives to circumvent litigation and prevent misreporting and shareholder scrutiny. Overall, the findings indicate that information describing one firm’s misreporting could affect the compensation policies of other firms, suggesting that regulatory enforcement accompanied by public awareness can effectively shape corporate behaviors. Data Availability: Data are available from the sources identified in the text. JEL Classifications: J33; G34; G58; M41; M52.