CEO bargaining power and compensation
利用美国州法院对不可避免披露原则的否决作为CEO议价能力的外生冲击，发现该否决导致CEO薪酬显著上升，尤其在CEO面临高工作流动性冲击或公司能有效利用该裁决作为谈判工具的企业中，薪酬增幅达22%至54%。
Abstract Contracting theories predict that CEO power plays an essential role in the pay‐setting process. I provide causal empirical evidence of how changes in the bargaining power of CEOs affect the level of CEO compensation. Using the staggered rejections of previously adopted inevitable disclosure doctrine (IDD) by US state courts to capture an exogenous increase in CEOs’ bargaining power, I find that the IDD rejection results in higher levels of CEO compensation. The effect is strongest in firms whose CEO‐board dynamics is significantly influenced by the IDD—firms whose CEOs face greatest job mobility shock and firms that can effectively use the IDD decision as a bargaining tool against their CEOs. The economic magnitudes are substantial in those subsamples of firms, ranging from 22% to 54% increase in compensation levels.