Regulating bank risk in a mobile labour market
论证在流动性高的银行劳动力市场中，奖金上限能提升社会福利，通过减少银行筛选人才和防止挖角带来的过度风险承担，比收紧资本约束更有效且成本更低。
This paper argues that bonus caps can be welfare improving in banking labour markets with high mobility. On the labour market, the largest banks hire the most talented traders, but they need to do so with contracts with high bonuses in order to both screen talent and to prevent poaching by smaller banks. This can lead to excessive risk taking. In some cases, it is socially optimal to prevent screening, leading to a less efficient matching of talent to banks, but also to less risk taking. Bonus caps can achieve this in a way that is both more effective and less costly than setting tighter capital constraints.