Directors' Bankruptcy Experience and Financial Reporting Choices
研究发现，经历过公司破产的董事，若自身损失较小，会更容忍其他任职公司的真实盈余管理行为，且独立董事和审计委员会成员的影响更明显。
ABSTRACT We identify directors who experience a corporate bankruptcy and examine how this professional experience affects monitoring at the other firms where they concurrently sit on the board. Using a sample of US directors interlocked with firms that file for bankruptcy, we find that directors have a greater tolerance for real earnings management after a low‐cost bankruptcy experience. This effect is stronger for independent directors and those who sit on the audit committee, consistent with a ratification and monitoring explanation. We do not find evidence consistent with the competing hypotheses that bankruptcy leads to directors' distraction or incentivizes efficient cost‐cutting strategies. We contribute to the research on the influence of directors' corporate experience over corporate outcomes, by providing evidence suggesting that surviving a bankruptcy relatively unscathed lowers directors' perception of the severity of distress costs, with negative consequences for decision control.