Strategic Scientific Disclosure: Evidence from the Leahy–Smith America Invents Act
研究了2011年美国发明法案实施后，技术竞争加剧如何促使专利申请落后的企业通过增加科学出版物来阻碍竞争对手获得专利，并发现这种策略有效增加了对手的专利驳回率。
ABSTRACT We examine the impact of technological competition on voluntary innovation disclosure around the enactment of the Leahy–Smith America Invents Act of 2011 (“AIA”). The AIA moves the US patent system from the first‐to‐invent to first‐inventor‐to‐file system and induces a patent race that increases technological competition. Firms that are slow to file a patent are disadvantaged in this race. We find that focal firms with lagging patent classes strategically increase scientific publications in their lagging technology areas in an attempt to block competitors from obtaining a patent. This effect is more pronounced in technology areas where the firm has better information about their relative competitive position (proxied by greater inventor mobility), in technology classes with constraints on increasing patent filing timeliness (proxied by fewer experienced attorneys), and areas characterized by more intense competition. We find that the peers of firms with lagging classes experience greater patent filing rejections for lack of novelty and obviousness reasons after the AIA, suggesting that strategic scientific disclosure is effective.