Predicting voluntary contributions by “revealed‐preference Nash‐equilibrium”
研究显示偏好纳什均衡能否预测一次性公共品博弈中的行为，发现该模型在样本外预测中优于其他社会偏好模型，并分析了均衡选择问题。
Abstract One‐shot public‐good situations are prominent in the public debate, and a prime example for behavior diverging from the standard Nash‐equilibrium. Could a Nash‐equilibrium predict one‐shot public‐good behavior in principle? A “revealed‐preference Nash‐equilibrium” ( rpne ) out‐of‐sample predicts behavior, outperforming other social‐preference models. The rpne is the set of “mutual conditional contributions,” interpreting elicited conditional contributions as best‐responses. Individual‐level analyses confirm the results and allow for studying equilibrium selection. While the Pareto‐dominant equilibrium is the modal choice, many participants use other criteria. Given the predictive positive‐contributions rpne s, many real‐life public‐good problems may be solvable if players could coordinate on an equilibrium‐selection criterion beforehand.