收购方董事会独立性与收购绩效:一项元分析

Acquirer board independence and acquisitions performance: A meta-analysis

International Review of Financial Analysis · 2025
被引 8
ABS 3

中文导读

通过元分析整合85项研究,发现收购方董事会独立性对收购绩效有正向影响,且股东权利会削弱这一关系,而债权人权利影响微弱。

Abstract

Using meta-analytical techniques, this study examines whether and how acquirer board independence affects acquisition performance. It also investigates the moderating effects of country-level formal institutions on this relationship to shed light on the fragmented empirical results reported by prior studies. Using a sample of 85 primary studies representing 646 effect sizes and a total of 1,131,639 observations, the overall results indicate a positive and significant relationship between acquirer board independence and acquisition performance. Moreover, the results of the three-level meta-regression analysis reveal that the country-level formal institutional factor of shareholder rights negatively moderates the focal relationship, while creditor rights have, at best, a minimal impact. This study blends insights from two theoretical perspectives—agency theory and transaction cost economics—and clarifies the strength and direction of the association between acquirer board independence and acquisition performance. Moreover, by incorporating institutional theory to examine the moderating effects of formal institutions, this study sheds light on how broader institutional contexts impact the effectiveness of corporate governance practices and their value implications in acquisition transactions. Accordingly, this study provides novel findings with empirically validated theoretical underpinnings. • The relationship between acquirer board independence and acquisition performance is examined. • A statistical meta-analysis is used to synthesize results from 85 empirical studies. • The moderating effects of country-level formal institutions are also examined. • A positive and significant relationship between acquirer board independence and acquisition performance is found. • The country-level formal institutional factor of shareholder rights negatively moderates the focal relationship, while creditor rights have, at best, a minimal impact.

公司治理并购绩效元分析制度理论