Uncertainty, Contracting, and Beliefs in Organizations
研究多部门公司中不确定性如何影响最优契约设计，发现对冲不确定性可减少内部分歧、降低激励成本，从而解释股权激励的普遍性和相对绩效契约的稀缺性。
Abstract We study the impact of uncertainty on optimal contracting in a multidivisional firm. Headquarters contract with division managers to induce effort. Uncertainty creates endogenous disagreement, thereby aggravating moral hazard. By hedging uncertainty, headquarters design incentive contracts that reduce disagreement and lower incentive provision costs, thereby promoting effort. Because hedging uncertainty can conflict with hedging risk, optimal contracts differ from those in standard principal-agent models. Our model helps explain the prevalence of equity-based incentive contracts and the rarity of relative-performance contracts, especially in firms facing greater uncertainty.