Compensation Consultants: Whom Do They Serve? Evidence from Consultant Changes
研究薪酬顾问变更，发现顾问利益与股东一致，会建议合理CEO薪酬；董事会会解雇建议偏差大的顾问，但强势CEO会干扰这一机制；更换顾问后CEO薪酬下降，董事获得更多股东支持。
Abstract We investigate whether compensation consultants recommend excessive pay to earn repeat business by studying consultant changes. Our results show consultants’ interests are aligned with shareholders’ to appropriately pay the CEO. Boards dismiss consultants making large pay recommendation errors, particularly positive ones. However, powerful or poorly monitored CEOs interfere with such disciplinary turnover, weakening the relation. Peer groups are more likely to change with new consultant appointments. New consultants are less likely to include highly paid executives in the compensation peer group and CEO pay falls following the change. Directors earn higher votes in annual elections when they replace compensation advisors.