Does fair value accounting affect how banks convey information about future performance? Evidence from SFAS 115
研究发现，在SFAS 115实施后，银行不再通过投资证券的已实现损益来传递未来业绩信号，因为公允价值披露要求提高了盈余管理的透明度，但同时也降低了分析师预测质量和增加了信息不对称。
Abstract Studies find that banks realize gains and losses on investment securities to signal changes in future operating performance. We do not find evidence of this behavior using a sample beginning after the enactment of Statement of Financial Accounting Standard 115 (SFAS 115). We hypothesize that SFAS 115’s fair value disclosure requirement caused managers to stop signaling with realized gains and losses (RGL) by increasing the transparency of RGL earnings management. Our tests indicate a significant reduction in the association between RGL and future earnings changes after SFAS 115, suggesting that the standard reduced RGL signaling. Consistent with a loss of valuable information, we find that analyst forecast quality decreased and information asymmetry increased for affected banks. Collectively, these findings suggest that SFAS 115 reduced earnings management with RGL, as the FASB intended, but may have reduced the informativeness of financial reporting at banks that previously used asset sales to signal.