Limits to Political Capture: Evidence from Patent Grants, Disclosures, and Litigation
研究发现美国专利商标局并未被政治俘获：政治关联申请人的专利虽稍易获批但质量较低，且审查中披露质量提升、诉讼率无异常，表明制度设计限制了政治利益。
ABSTRACT Substantial evidence suggests that regulatory agencies in the United States can be captured by the politicians who oversee them. We provide novel evidence of a federal agency in which capture is limited: the United States Patent and Trademark Office. Although patent applications from politically connected applicants are slightly more likely to be approved despite being of lower ex post quality, additional analyses suggest these outcomes are not indicative of capture. In particular, the disclosure quality of connected patents' legal claims increases more than unconnected patents during the review process, narrowing the scope of the patents and constraining the intellectual property rights. Furthermore, connected patents are no more likely than others to be litigated ex post, suggesting these patent grants are not spurious. Our findings provide insights into how the design of a regulator can limit the benefits that accrue to politically connected firms.