The Political Economy of School Finance Systems With Endogenous State and Local Tax Policies
研究了美国各州法院裁定教育支出不平等违宪后，不同学校财政体系（州与地方混合资助）如何通过州和地方选举中的投票影响均衡结果，并用计算模型预测选民偏好与实际设计相符的混合体系。
ABSTRACT Beginning in the 1970s, many state courts declared the widespread inequality in education spending across schools a violation of their state's constitution. Funding systems then emerged providing differing approaches to state and local support of education. We develop a theoretical framework and characterize outcomes under alternative systems. Our framework has voting over policies in both state and local elections. A counterpart computational model compares equilibrium outcomes under the alternative school finance systems and examines across state differences in expenditures. The model predicts that voters prefer systems with mixed state and local finance with designs mirroring those observed in practice.